ABSTRACT Public social environments are hot beds of security leaks, either they are virtual or physical. The nature of social settings allows numerous people to co-exist in the same space. This close un-bounded proximity opens up the possibility of privacy compromise in such environments. In this paper, we explore a novel and practical multi-modal side-channel keystroke recognition system, named ClickLeak, which can infer the PIN code/password entered on numeric keypad by using the commodity Wi-Fi devices. Such numeric keypads are commonly available in many public social environments. ClickLeak is built on the observation that each key input makes unique pattern of hand and finger movements, and this generates unique distortions to multi-path Wi-Fi signals. Acceleration and microphone sensors of smart phones determine the starting and ending time of keystrokes, while the time series of channel state information are analyzed to determine the keystrokes. The evaluation results have shown that with large scale data collections from public social settings, the key recognition accuracy can reach higher than 83%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social environments may exist in virtual and real worlds, where large scale data collection can be performed to compromise the privacy of users. While there is a lot of focus on virtual social environments [1] , [2] , it is important to note that the physical public settings are affected by similar privacy concerns of information leak. The basic premise is that the line dividing physical social setting and virtual social networks is slowly diminishing, as shown in Fig. 1 . Such new systems are referred as cyber-physical social networks [3] , [4] . With this overlap of networks, the challenge of privacy and user data collection without consent or knowledge has become more important. Such data collection may not only be done by service providers, but by malicious individuals who can exist in the environment without restrictions.
Some common examples of public social environments are restaurants, malls, or other places where people exist in close proximity of each other with no clear boundaries of communication. Use of technology to collect large scale data about users is very similar in both virtual and physical environments. Tracking user with sessions and cookies in online systems, is same as tracking people of their location in restaurants or malls using their smart phones. The amount of time spent reading a certain profile or liking a picture on social media, is similar to browsing products on a shopping isle or conversation time spent with other specific people, which can be tracked by Wi-Fi signals. Existence of such systems on commercial scale is not new [5] . Similarly, surveillance cameras in physical social spaces can use facial recognition software to not only identify people, but track their facial expressions while interacting with inanimate objects [6] . Moreover, large scale datasets for cross referencing are also easily available [7] , [8] , and commercial use in public spaces is becoming common [9] - [12] . Other major areas of this overlap of social physical & virtual networks, are the augmented reality or cyber-physical social games. Ingress, Pokemon GO, and LyteShot are prime examples, which take virtual social networks and transform them to physical social environments. Similarly, social networks similar to [13] are designed for people to physically meet. An interesting observation noted in [14] is that people meeting physically tend to connect through virtual networks also, while the reverse is also observed more commonly then perceived.
In this paper, we demonstrate that close proximity of people in social environments can be exploited to steal information from unsuspecting acquaintances by using Wi-Fi signals. It is important to note that, due to the virtual and physical network connection, the victim may never realize that close proximity will compromise the integrity of their information. The scenario this paper assumes is that of restaurants, shopping malls, or other social spaces where a pincode/password needs to be entered on a keypad. Point of Sales (POS) are common in many such places. The prime objective of an attacker is to obtain information without getting identified or even suspected of information theft. This can be easily achieved if the attacker and victim know each other. Such a scenario can be created by using different social networks described earlier, which can help the attacker gain close proximity to victims. By placing their smart phone inconspicuously close to the keypad while the victim punches the keys (even if concealed from view), the keys can be identified. There are a large number of methods to steal pin codes by recognizing keystrokes, which consists of various direct and indirect eavesdropping attacks [15] - [21] . Direct eavesdropping attacks including vision based approaches which directly observe the process of typing keys. Acoustic emission based approaches, motion sensor based approaches, camera based approaches, and electromagnetic emission based approaches are indirect eavesdropping attacks which are also called side channel attacks. Acoustic emission based approaches are designed based on the observation that different keys make different typing sounds. Electromagnetic emission based approaches are realized on account of the observation that electromagnetic emanations from keyboard's electrical circuit underneath different keys are different. However, prior works are interested in the long-term keystrokes inference, while the motion of typing pin codes of credit or debit cards is short-term action. Moreover, victims who are conscious of their surroundings, may become suspicious of close-proximity or undesired behavior of the attacker.
This work proposes a keystroke inference system named ClickLeak, which allows attackers to infer keystrokes through Wi-Fi signals when victims enter their credit or debit card pin codes on the POS. ClickLeak is inspired by the observation that typing different keys makes different hand and finger movements which generates different distortions to multipath Wi-Fi signals. And the unique Wi-Fi signal distortions can be leveraged to recognize keystrokes. We utilize the finegrained feature Channel State Information (CSI), captured from the received Wi-Fi signals to infer keystrokes. Besides, the keystroke signal segments can be determined by fusing the microphone and accelerometer readings, which are induced synchronously as the finger strikes the key.
ClickLeak includes a mobile phone as sender in close proximity of POS, and a laptop as receiver as shown in Fig. 2 . The sender continuously sends Wi-Fi signals and the receiver collects them. When card owners type pin codes on the POS which is next to the mobile phone, ClickLeak infers keystrokes by the variation of CSI. Realizing the potential of keystroke recognition scheme in a real system involves three key technical challenges. 1) The keystroke motion is too subtle to get distinct CSI variation so an effective signal analysis method is critical to distinguish keystrokes correctly. 2) Since ClickLeak continuously collects CSI values from the receiver, the movement of entering pin codes occurs in a short time. Therefore, the starting and ending time of key press is required rather than analyzing the whole CSI time series. 3) When getting CSI time series of keystrokes, the mean of keystroke segmentation should be used to get the starting and ending point in the CSI time series for each keystroke.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We identify how an attacker can compromise information of victim by exploiting virtual social networks which uses physical interactions between users, to gain confidence and close proximity.
• We propose a context-based system ClickLeak, which makes use of a smartphone and laptop receiver to extract CSI values to profile the patterns of keystrokes.
• We propose a method to select subcarriers which are strongly correlated with the keystrokes and show that this method increases the keystroke recognition accuracy.
• We use the critical phase feature of CSI time series and combine the CSI amplitude and phase waveforms [24] not only detects human respiration but also develops techniques to relate one's breathing depth, location and orientation to determine ability of respiration. The system WifiU [25] captures fine-grained gait patterns with Wi-Fi signals to recognize human.
B. KEYSTROKE RECOGNITION METHODS
In general, the methods to recognize keystrokes are divided into four categories: Motion sensor based, Audio signal based, Camera based, and Wireless signal based.
1) MOTION SENSOR BASED
Motion sensors provide rich information to recognize keystrokes. Some researchers use the reading of smartphone accelerometer when victims entering pin codes to recognize the keystrokes on the phone [26] , [27] . Others have analyzed the readings from smartwatch accelerometer and inferred keystrokes on the keyboard [16] , [28] . Both these approaches require direct access to the motion sensor on the phone or watch of the victim.
2) AUDIO SIGNAL BASED
Work in [20] extracts the acoustic signals received by off-the-shelf phones and then uses Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) based method to infer the keys entered. [19] utilizes TDoA measurements and acoustic features, and proposes a training-free approach on a smartphone that does not require a linguistic model, allowing it to recover random keystrokes. The audio techniques are more prone to background interference in social settings where the background noise may not allow detection of feint keystrokes.
3) CAMERA BASED
Reference [17] proposes a video-based attack method which utilizes the spatio-temporal dynamics of hands during typing on the smartphone to recover keystrokes. Reference [18] provides a video-based system which is built upon the observation that the keystrokes on different points of the tablet cause its backside to exhibit different motion patterns. This allows an attacker to infer a tablet user's typed inputs on the touchscreen by recording and analyzing the video of the tablet backside. Using video based techniques require uninterrupted recordings of victims, which are difficult to collect without raising suspicion of people in the environment.
4) WIRELESS SIGNAL BASED
One of the most discrete way of detecting keystrokes is through the use of Wi-Fi signals. Work in [29] proposes to use the shape feature of CSI waveform to uniquely classify all the keys on a keyboard. Reference [30] proposes a system to recognize the pin codes in the smartphone using the CSI waveform shapes. Compared to these works, our proposed ClickLeak adds a keystroke discovery module to remove the CSI time series when there are no keystrokes. This reduces the analysis time and false key identification significantly. Moreover, we demonstrate the system using POS (Point of Sales) with added phase feature of CSI time series. Using the phase feature, classification accuracy is greatly enhanced.
III. SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS
We consider a scenario where the victim uses a keypad to enter pin codes to gain/authorize access. A typical example of such a system in public social environments is the POS which often uses numeric keypads for customers to enter pin codes. The smartphone is placed next to the POS on the desk, and records the acceleration and microphone data continuously. The system uses this sensor data to detect the coarse starting and ending time when customers enter pin codes and then send them to the keystroke inferring module. Meanwhile, the smartphone constantly generates Wi-Fi signals, which are intercepted by a nearby laptop or computer. After that, the computer uses keystroke recognition method to recognize pin codes. Fig.3 shows the different modules of ClickLeak which will be explained in the following subsections. available in many commercial devices with NICs like Atheros 9390 NIC [31] and Intel 5300 NIC [32] . The proposed system uses the complex value H i to represent the wireless channel state CFR of sub-carrier i at time t. X i and Y i denote transmitter and receiver signal of sub-carrier i at time t respectively. They are related by the expression
where 
where |H i | and θ denote the CSI amplitude and phase of subcarrier i at time t, respectively.
B. KEYSTROKE DISCOVERY MODULE
The transmitter sends wireless signals to the receiver continuously, but we are only interested in the time windows when the victims enter the pin codes. To detect the sensitive input time window, ClickLeak uses the smartphone sensors including microphone and accelerometer to roughly obtain the starting and ending time of keystrokes. Combination of both microphone an accelerometer, provides a better chance of detecting the correct starting and ending times.
C. CSI PREPROCESSING MODULE
In comparison with previous works [29] , [30] , we take the phase feature of CSI time series as an important feature to infer keystrokes. Calibration procedure are required as the phase information is easily contaminated by background noise. The noise in CSI time series mostly occurs at high frequencies while the frequency variation caused by keystroke motions is much lower than noise. Therefore, we use low pass to filter CSI time series. We observe from experiments that not all the sub-carriers are strongly affected by the motions of finger and hand, hence we select sub-carriers which have stronger correlation with keystrokes. PCA based filtering is used to identify the strongest subcarrier correlated with keystroke.
D. KEYSTROKE INFERRING MODULE
It is essential to find the starting and ending time of each keystroke in the CSI time series. We have observed from experimentation that there are sharp rises or falls at the starting and ending time of a keystroke. Hence, we first calculate the differences between adjacent elements of CSI time series, and use this difference to select the time points where peaks are above a certain threshold. Afterwards we adjust the staring and ending time of each extracted keystroke to make waveforms with complete keystrokes. Intuitively and from experimental observation, we find that the same keys share same waveform shapes and differ from other keys. Thus, we adopt the waveform shapes as the feature of keystrokes. Since different keystrokes last for different times, and the sizes of keystroke waveforms are different, we use Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance which can operate with inputs of different lengths as the comparison distance in the classifier. We conduct Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to compress the dimension of waveform followed by k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) classifier to train and classify the keystroke waveforms.
IV. CLICKLEAK DESIGN
In this section, we describe each of the three modules of ClickLeak system in detail. Keystroke Discovery Module detects the time windows for pin codes entry, CSI Preprocessing Module removes outliers and noise from the CSI time series and Keystroke Inferring Module extracts the CSI waveform of each keystroke and infers the corresponding number.
A. KEYSTROKE DISCOVERY MODULE
ClickLeak utilizes the readings from microphone and accelerometer sensors of the smartphone to discover the coarse starting and ending time of the keystrokes. The smartphone when placed in close proximity of POS on the table, detects both. The audio signals detected by microphone of keystrokes, are easily contaminated by the ambient noise like the music and conversation. Although the vibration signals produced by accelerometer are not easily contaminated as shown in Fig. 4(d) , the keystroke motions sometimes are too subtle to be picked by the accelerometer sensor. Therefore, we combine these two sensors to discover this sensitive time window. Following steps are performed in order to detect key press.
Step 1: Fig. 4(a) shows that the audio signal detected during the keypress window is full of noise. Fig. 4(b) shows that frequency components of keystrokes lie in range above 12KHz. In light of this, the platform performs bandpass filtering and normalization with the audio time series to reduce the influence of environmental noise. In order to get the outline of the time series, we use the absolute value of Hilbert transformed time series to replace the original time series. As seen in the first figure of Fig. 4(d) , the audio time series shows strong correlation with keystrokes.
Step 2: Fig. 4(d) shows that the peaks of vibration and audio time series are the time when victims enter pin codes. In this step the system calculates the time points when there exists peaks related to the keystrokes. We only collect the peaks whose heights are above the pre-set threshold. From experimentation we observed that when entering one key, the audio time series produces a pair of peaks, i.e., pressing or releasing of key. ClickLeak system only records the first peak time point to replace this pair of time points. Let I a = {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i n } and I v = {j 1 , j 2 , · · · , j m } be the collection of qualified peaks for microphone and accelerometer sensor respectively.
Step 3: The time points identified from previous step are in fact the sample indexes in the time series. Moreover the sampling rate of the two sensors used are different. Hence, we use the time point vectors divided by corresponding sample rate to represent the time of keystrokes. Following this, we use the two time point vectors to add their corresponding starting times. The final audio and vibration time point vectors are named as T a and T v respectively.
Step 4: In a real environment, it is possible that the audio and vibration sensor may miss some of the keystroke time points. This will result in an unequal and/or unaligned number of indexes in the time point vector. In this step, we create an overlay of both T a and T v , using the initial sensor starting time. Both sensors start sampling at the same time (triggered by the attacker). As shown in Fig. 4(d) , there are missing time points for both sensor vectors. Even if both the vectors have same number of points, they may not be aligned. Hence, we first find those time points which are direct match. Two time points are considered direct match in T a and T v if they satisfy |T a (i) − T v (j)| < T h , where T h is a threshold for misaligned time points due to different sampling rates, i and j represent peaks in respective vectors. These are indicated with red squares in the example. Following this, an overlay of both time lines is created, where direct match time points are considered as a single point. Missing points in one vector are covered from the other vector. The resulting overlay vector is used to determine the first and last time points, which are then forwarded to the keystroke inferring module.
B. CSI PREPROCESSING MODULE
Compared with other Wi-Fi signal based keystroke inference works, we not only use the amplitude of CSI time series but also utilize the phase feature. Because of the randomness of noise in phase, it cannot be used directly. In this paper, we conduct mathematical linear transformation of the phase. We then remove the high frequency noise and perform the PCA based dimension reduction with the amplitude and phase in the similar way. Detailed process is given below.
1) PHASE TRANSFORMATION
The objective of phase transformation is to extract close-toreal phase from the contaminated CSI signals. For a subcarrier i, the measured phase ∧ φ i can be related with the true phase φ i described as below
where δ is the time offset at the receiver, β denotes the unknown phase deviation, and Z is the measured noise. K i represents the index value of subcarrier i according to IEEE 802.11n standard [33] . Because β and Z are unkown, we can not obtain the true phase through commercial Wi-Fi devices. We transform the phase information using the PADS method proposed in [34] . As a result, we obtain the transformed phase information which is not the real phase, but very close to it. As shown in Fig. 5 , the contaminated CSI can be transformed to a usable phase time series, which strongly correlates to motion of hands and fingers.
2) LOW PASS FILTERING
From Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 6(a) , we find that both the transformed phase and raw amplitude time series contains noise. It is observed that the frequencies of variations caused by motion of entering pin codes are much lower than most of noise. To remove the high frequency noise, we choose Butterworth low-pass filter [35] , which has a maximally flat amplitude response in the passband for all low-pass filters and thus does not distort variations of the main motion in the CSI series. Reference [30] demonstrates that the frequencies of CSI time series correlated with keystrokes are in the range from 2Hz to 30Hz, hence we set the filter transition band as 30Hz to 80Hz. Fig. 6(a) shows the raw CSI amplitude time series of subcarrier 1 and Fig. 6(b) shows the corresponding low pass filtered CSI amplitude time series. Examination of these figures show that, the filtered amplitude time series preserves the components related to the keystrokes and is much more clear in the filtered signal.
3) SUBCARRIERS SELECTION
In the collected 2 × 3 × 30 CSI 1 streams, we observe that some CSI amplitude streams show strong correlation with hand and finger movements while others' fluctuations are not obvious. Therefore, it is necessary to remove the unrelated sub-carriers and retain the strongly related sub-carriers
a: REMOVING SUB-CARRIERS WITH SMALL VARIANCE
We use matrix A to represent the low pass filtered CSI amplitude streams. For instance, if we obtain 30 CSI amplitude streams from 30 sub-carriers in each pair of antennas, and with sample number N , then matrix A has N rows and 30 columns in each pair of antennas. We calculate the variance of each column of A, and remove the sub-carriers whose variance is less than the max variance multiplied with a threshold. Finally we obtain the matrix A v which has N rows and less than 30 columns.
b: K-MEANS BASED SELECTING SUB-CARRIERS
There are two different kinds of CSI amplitude streams, in which the first kind shows clear correlation with keystrokes while the second one rarely fluctuates. Thus, we cluster data into two categories using the K-means clustering method, where the comparison approach is correlation distance method. Following this we can remove the category whose variance of centroid locations is small, and retrieve 1 As described in section III-A, T x = 2, R x = 3, and N s = 30.
matrix A k whose sub-carriers show stronger correlation with keystrokes than matrix A.
4) PCA BASED FILTERING
Once the sub-carrier selection has been completed, there still remains more than one subcarrier for each antenna pair. Therefore, it is necessary to remove the unrelated or noisy sub-carriers and retain the best related sub-carriers. We adopt Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to process CSI time series, because PCA not only reduces the dimension of CSI time series but also obtains the CSI streams which are most relevant to hand and finger movements and removes the unrelated noise. After PCA based filtering, the time series are listed in descending order by the proportion of the principal components. As show in Fig. 6(c) , the first component shows the main correlation with entering pin codes and the others are unrelated noise. We take the first amplitude component A c and phase component P c for every antenna pair in the keystroke inferring module.
C. KEYSTROKE INFERRING MODULE
In this subsection we detail the process of extracting waveforms for each keystroke, the feature selection, and the waveform classification process.
1) KEYSTROKE WAVEFORM SEGMENTATION
Once the subcarrier selection is complete, the CSI amplitude and phase time series show strong relation with the keystroke movements. It is essential to get the starting and ending time of CSI time series for every keystroke. The CSI amplitude shows stronger correlation with hand and finger movements than the CSI phase. In addition, the starting and ending points of the amplitude and phase time series are the same, therefore we first choose the CSI amplitude time series A c to perform keystroke waveform segmentation and then use the starting and ending points to directly segment the CSI phase time series P c .
a: SMOOTHING AMPLITUDE STREAM
After PCA based filtering, the CSI amplitude time series A c maintains a strong correlation with keystrokes, but there still exists some noise. Smoothing the stream makes it easier to identify peaks. The smoothed stream is represented by A s . Fig. 7(a) shows rises or falls at the starting and ending time for keystrokes in the amplitude time series. In order to get the location of sharp rises and falls we calculate differences between adjacent elements of A s and obtain absolute values of these differences, which are shown in Fig. 7(b) . Followed by identifying absolute differences, we set the parameters of minimum peak height, minimum peak prominence and minimum peak width to find the qualified peaks. Fig. 7(b) is a sample from real experiment, which demonstrates that the identification of peaks by the proposed algorithm is correct. The qualified peeks are marked with red and unqualified with green squares. 
b: CALCULATING PEAKS OF ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCES

c: REMOVING UNQUALIFIED PEAKS
It is observed that there are peaks in time series which are unrelated to the keystroke, as identified by green markers in Fig. 7(b) . In order to filter out these peaks, we set a threshold which is the max peak height multiplied by a ratio to remove the peaks whose height is lower than the threshold. The output of this step is a stream T p with 2m locations if there are m keystrokes.
d: LOCATION CALIBRATION
The locations of the selected peaks are not exactly the starting and ending points of keystrokes as shown in Fig. 7(a) . For the ith keystroke, we use follow equation to get the estimated starting point s i and ending point e i .
where L left and L right are the intervals on both sides of the estimated keystroke. The intervals can guarantee that the keystroke waveforms are complete. Fig. 7(c) shows the mapping onto original, as proof that peak starting and ending points are correctly identified.
2) KEYSTROKE RECOGNITION
Before differentiating keystrokes, we should select suitable features that can uniquely represent keystrokes. As shown in Fig. 6(a) , the amplitude waveform shapes of same keys are similar and the waveform shapes of different keys are different. So the amplitude waveform shapes can be used as a feature. It is also observed that the phase waveforms share the same characters with the amplitude waveforms. Therefore we choose both the amplitude and phase waveform shapes as the classifier feature. Since the keystroke duration can be different and the sample number for each keystroke is different, therefore, in the classification process we apply the method Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) which supports inputs of different lengths to calculate different keystroke waveforms distances. Before classifying we conduct Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) with keystroke waveforms in order to compress the length of waveforms. Discrete Wavelet Transform supports both time and frequency domain analysis in the signal at the same time and it is much more sensitive than Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT) to the abrupt changes in signals. The DWT decomposes signals into approximation coefficients and detail coefficients. The approximation coefficients represent the large scale low-frequency components of the signal which are related to the hand and finger movements while the detail coefficients describe the high-frequency components of the signal which are both high-frequency noise and the fine details of the signal. Since we are interested in the VOLUME 5, 2017 low-frequency components related to keystroke movements, we adopt the approximation coefficients to represent the keystroke waveform.
For each loop of DWT decomposition, the length of approximation coefficients is half of the input series length. The (j + 1) th DWT decomposition is conducted on the base of the j th decomposition and the length of (j + 1) th approximation coefficient is half of j th approximation coefficient length. We use approximation coefficients to represent the keystrokes instead of original CSI waveforms in order to significantly reduce the computation costs. To achieve the balance between computation costs and waveform principle information preservation, we should select proper wavelet basis and decomposition level. After comparing different solutions, we adopt the Daubechies D4 wavelet basis and 3-level DWT decomposition. So the 3 rd level approximation coefficient of keystroke waveform is used as the feature of keystrokes.
a: CLASSIFIER TRAINING WITH DYNAMIC TIME WARPING
DTW allows similar shapes of input time series to match even if their lengths are different. DTW uses dynamic programming to obtain minimum distance alignment between any two input signals. For inputs of different lengths, DTW conducts non-linear mapping of one input to another and chooses the Euclidean distance of the optimal warping path between them [36] . Shorter DTW distances means input time series have more similarity.
ClickLeak utilizes the obtained DWT waveform feature of keystrokes to train models. We adopt the scheme k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classifiers and use the DTW distance between keystroke waveforms as the comparison metric. In order to combine the amplitude and phase waveform, we redefine the comparison metric based on DTW distance and the distance of keystroke i and j as the equation below
where amp i and amp j are the amplitude waveforms of keystroke i and j while angle i and angle j are the phase waveforms of keystroke i and j. D dtw is the function to calculate the DTW distance. We have observed from experimentation, that the accuracy of classification is better with the combined amplitude and phase waveforms as compared to individual features.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION A. SYSTEM SETUP
We conduct the experiments in a social setting with off-theshelf hardware devices. The receiving system runs Ubuntu 10.04 LTS with 2.6.36 kernel and is equipped with Intel Wi-Fi Link 5300 (iwl5300) 802.11n NIC with three receiving antennas. The driver of NIC works as an Access Points (APs) at 2.4GHz modified as [32] to collect the CSI packets. The CSI values are extracted from ICMP ping packets. The sending smartphone is equipped with two 802.11n transmitting antennas. The 2×3 MIMO system produces 6 spacial streams and achieves the spacial diversity required for ClickLeak.
We place a Android based Nexus 6P next to the POS so as to record the audio and vibration signals when someone enters the pin codes on the POS. The receiving antennas are at a distance of approximate 70cm from the POS. We set the transmission rate as 1000 packet/s which can ensure enough CSI time resolution to capture the details of keystroke movements. The sampling frequency of microphone and accelerometer are set at 44.1 kHz with fast model (approximately 820 Hz).
The setup of experiment is similar to a real world scenario where the attacker casually places the phone close to POS while the victim is making a payment. An accomplice with receiving equipment (e.g., laptop) can stand in line behind the victim, without raising any suspicion
To evaluate the performance of ClickLeak, we collect dataset from 10 volunteers. The volunteers are right-handed and they enter the pin codes in the POS using their own way. Each user provides 50 samples for each of the 10 keys (from 0 to 9).
B. CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY
For each of the ten users we build a classifier using all corresponding samples and calculate the classification accuracy of these classifiers using 10-fold cross validation. We evaluate the average accuracy of each key, average accuracy of each user, and the confusion matrix of keys. The average accuracy of each key is the average of ten users' accuracies for corresponding key. The average accuracy of a given user is the average of all 10 keys' accuracies for that user.
ClickLeak achieves the total keystroke recognition accuracy of 89%. Fig. 8(a) shows the average classification accuracy of each key across all users. All of these classification accuracies are above 83% with highest key accuracy at 96%. Fig. 8(b) shows the average accuracy of each user across all keys and all of the user accuracies are above 85%. Fig. 8(c) show the color map of the confusion matrix, in which each column represents the keys classified by ClickLeak, and each row represents the keys entered by users. Darker shade of cells mean higher possibility to be recognized.
C. PIN CODES RECOGNITION
In order to simulate the practical scenario, we only use three loops of 0-9 keys for each of the ten users as their corresponding training data. For the test data each user enters 20 set of 6-digit pin codes, where the codes are randomly generated by the system. The system collects and analyzes 200 set of 6-digit pin codes. Out of 1200 key presses, 864 were identified correctly. For the 6-digit pin codes, we introduce a new metric top N candidates recognition rate which indicates the rate of inferring pin codes successfully when trying N times. Fig. 9 shows that when we just use one candidate to infer pin codes, the recognition rate is only about 20% and the recognition rate increases with more candidates. When we use 100 candidates to infer pin codes, the system can recognize correctly 78% of these pin codes. This is an interesting finding of our work. Larger data collection from user improves the accuracy of correct identification. Hence, larger the social circle of attacker is, the higher the chances to steal information are.
D. IMPACT OF SELECTING SUBCARRIERS
Compared with previous works, we adopt selecting subcarriers before PCA based dimension reduction in the process of CSI preprocessing module. PCA works well in collecting the correlated sub-carriers, but the sub-carriers with little fluctuation may affect the correlated PCA components, hence we remove these uncorrelated sub-carriers. Fig. 10 shows the classification accuracy before and after selecting subcarriers for each key. It can be observed that the classification accuracy after selecting subcarriers improves the key identification significantly across the board.
E. IMPACT OF CONNECTING AMPLITUDE AND PHASE
Previous works abandon CSI phase because it is easily contaminated by the noise, and cannot be used directly like CSI amplitude. In our work, we find that after simple transformation, the calibrated phase can work as well as amplitude. In Fig. 11 , we can observe that the classification using phase performs similar to amplitude. The classification accuracy using both amplitude and phase becomes significantly higher.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The boundaries of social networks have spilled out of the virtual network domain. A number of augmented reality and cyber-physical applications are available, which create an overlap of both virtual social networks and physical social circles. This overlapping creates enormous privacy concerns, as the close physical proximity may allow an attacker to steal information from victims without raising suspicion. In this work, we address a problem which allows the attacker to use close proximity to steal PIN codes from users. The system adopts commodity hardware to infer keystrokes using Wi-Fi CSI time series. Compared with other Wi-Fi signal based keystroke recognition methods, we select the sub-carriers which are strongly correlated with keystroke movements before PCA based dimension reduction and add the phase feature of CSI time series. In addition, we utilize the microphone and accelerometer sensors to discover the sensitive time window when victims enter pin codes. Experimentation setup to mimic a social setting demonstrates the effectiveness of system. The key identification accuracy is above 83%. With a lager network and more users the accuracy of system increases significantly.
